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Despite significant progress in economic reform throughout the 1990s and an exemplary 
development of the policymaking framework in the second part of the decade,  Brazil 
suffered a major public debt and currency crisis in 2002.  Though the political origin of 
the uncertainty cannot be ignored, the paper identifies other sources of uncertainty 
emanating from the policymaking framework: fiscal policy was not responsive to the 
shocks, public debt instruments were used with several objectives to stabilize the 
currency and lengthen maturity, and there was inadequate supervision of agents holding 
public debt.  Most of the flaws have been fixed following the crisis: the primary fiscal 
balance has been increased, sending the signal that it is a flexible instrument that will be 
used to ensure commitment of the sovereign to honor its obligations;   the central bank 
formally transferred to the Treasury the remaining debt-issuance functions, facilitating  a 
more adequate balancing of different risks involved in debt management;  and mutual 
funds’ public debt holdings are better regulated, ensuring that end-investors have the 
proper information to assess the risk of the institutions in which they invest. 
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1.  Throughout the 1990s, Brazil initiated a process of economic reform including 
liberalizing trade, relaxing price controls, and privatizing public enterprises.  Although 
initially some problems remained,  the country was able to correct most of these, 
including higher public sector deficits and limited exchange rate flexibility,  and steer a 
course toward stability by the end of the millennium. However, the positive outlook 
deteriorated in 2001 –2002 because of several shocks: (i) the domestic energy shock in 
2001 that led to the rationing of electricity consumption; (ii) the worldwide uncertainty 
and risk aversion arising from the corporate corruption scandals in developed markets 
and the September 11 terrorist attacks; (iii) the collapse of Argentina’s economy that 
represented 11 percent of the exports of goods and the country’s debt default that rocked 
emerging economies’ sovereign bond spreads and currencies; (iv) the oil price shock 
resulting from the international political situation; (v) the economic slowdown in the 
United States and Europe; and (vi) the uncertainty surrounding the 2002 presidential 
election.  As a result, domestic growth slowed down from 4.4 percent in 2000 to 1.5 
percent in 2002, sovereign spreads rose from about 700 to 2,400 basis points, the 
currency depreciated from 2.4 to 4 reais per dollar,  and the debt to GDP ratio worsened 
from 49.3 percent  in 2000 to 57 percent at the end of 2002. 
2.  This paper analyzes why these shocks derailed the economy despite the 
significant progress in economic policymaking in the previous years.  The report aims to 
draw lessons from Brazil’s recent experience of going into a tail-spin despite having in 
place a good policymaking framework.  The objective is to make this framework more 
robust so that it works well in both favorable scenarios and adverse circumstances.   
3.  The paper is organized in four sections following this introduction. The first one 
describes the main elements of the  monetary and fiscal policy mix during 2001-2002 and 
interprets the observed outcomes mostly as a result of policy rigidity and the particular 
public debt composition prior to the crisis.  Fiscal policy constraints emanated from both 
structural budget rigidities and short-term political factors.  As the primary surplus 
remained stable while public debt ratios rose and the presidential candidates debated over 
the future stance of fiscal policy,  concerns on the future value of public debt dominated 
investor sentiment. This fact precipitated a fall in the demand for government securities 
forcing the central bank to intervene in the market by: 1) printing money to redeem 
amortizations coming due; 2) providing support for government securities’ prices by 
holding larger shares of government bonds in its own portfolio; and 3) facilitating the 
change in private agents’ portfolios from long-term fixed-rate instruments to shorter 
maturity and indexed paper.  Given the increased uncertainty on how the rising debt 
levels would be serviced without changes in the primary surplus, agents expected part of 
the adjustment to be through higher inflation, regardless of the central bank’s targets or 
actions. In these circumstances, monetary policy constraints emanated mainly from the 
fiscal policy and public debt management problems. 4 
4.    The second section discusses public debt management, which may be geared to 
compensate structural budget rigidities, but may also amplify the negative effects of 
external shocks if the cost-risk trade-offs are not adequately balanced.  Ideally, public 
debt composition would be such that, in response to a negative shock to the budget, debt 
service would decrease.  However, the  Brazilian structure of public debt, mostly indexed 
to the exchange rate or to short run interest rates, amplified the negative effects of the 
supply and international capital markets shocks.  Prior to the crisis, debt managers were 
able to extend maturity of the debt, reducing roll-over risk, at the expense of increasing 
exchange rate risk and interest rate risk.  By issuing exchange rate-linked and Selic-
indexed debt, the public sector provided private agents hedging instruments against 
unexpected shocks in these variables,  at the expense of rising debt levels when the risks 
materialized in 2002. This rise can be interpreted as the cost of attempting to reduce roll-
over risk in a very uncertain environment. In this sense, indexation was used as a 
substitute for credibility, but with a high cost.  As credibility is affirmed, debt managers 
will be able to choose the debt instruments balancing better the risks, especially of shocks 
to the exchange rate, so that the likelihood of debt stabilization is maximized.  In this 
fashion, the debt management strategy may be consistent with other elements of the 
policymaking framework in minimizing uncertainty arising from expected future policy 
actions. 
5.  The third section discusses fiscal rules as commitment mechanisms for the 
government’s future policy actions. Commitment is crucial because private agents’ 
current decisions, such as holding public bonds or investing, depend on expectations of 
future government actions.   This binding mechanism will keep expectations of fiscal 
actions within some ranges, and hence, ensure that inflationary expectations arising from 
fiscal scenarios are consistent with the central bank’s targets.  In this sense, fiscal rules 
are a necessary complement to any robust monetary management framework and 
predictable debt management strategy.  Though Brazil already has a fiscal commitment 
mechanism that has worked well, namely, the Fiscal Responsibility Law, it may be 
improved to minimize the  likelihood of situations such as those of 2002 resurfacing.  
This chapter proposes several avenues for potential improvement, focusing on the 
adoption of an explicit fiscal rule that targets a medium-term debt level and defines the 
primary balance as the instrument to achieve that objective, while allowing the operation 
of automatic stabilizers along the business cycle.  The relative weights assigned to the 
debt stabilization or the cyclical components of the rule could change over time 
according to society’s preferences.  Practical implementation of this proposal would 
require attention to two factors: one, that during the initial stage, while credibility in the 
debt-targeting mechanism is established, higher priority be assigned to the debt 
stabilization argument; two, that any change  allowing operation of automatic stabilizers 
be undertaken during the recovery phase of the business cycle to avoid lower primary 
balances in the initial implementation phase which may hamper credibility. The fourth 
and final section summarizes the main lessons and conclusions. 
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6.  Brazil has learned through hard experience that some combinations of fiscal, 
monetary, and public debt management policies are not sustainable.  Sustainability of the 
policymaking framework hinges on its capacity to absorb shocks and the coordination of 
its different elements in changing environments.  When one of the elements is 
constrained to react to a shock, the other has to be more responsive, and policymakers 
have to judge which restrictions are more binding.  Policy rigidity is historically 
associated with crises in Brazil and the 2002  events may be interpreted as one more case.  
At that time, however, the inflexible tool was fiscal policy which had served well as an 
escape valve in previous crises episodes.  This chapter describes the quest for a flexible 
framework in the first section, while the second one interprets the 2002 crisis mostly as a 
result of rigidity remaining in it. 
A. THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY TO ENSURE CONSISTENCY OF THE POLICYMAKING 
FRAMEWORK 
7.  In 1994, Brazil adopted the Real Plan, which brought down high inflation and 
stabilized it at international levels.  Unfortunately, Brazilian fiscal accounts weakened 
progressively. Inflation was not only a revenue source but was also a useful mechanism 
to control government expenditures in real terms during the high inflation era (Cardoso, 
1998). This loss of flexibility, combined with a lack of decisive fiscal reform, implied 
rising public sector deficits. The excess spending relative to national income was 
financed in liquid  international capital markets. As a result, both public and private debt 
increased. 
8.  The central bank sterilized these capital inflows through open market operations 
to avoid monetary expansion and  maintain a pegged exchange rate.  This response 
complicated the situation even more because it entailed rising central bank (domestic) 
indebtedness and climbing interest rates that increased the cost of servicing public debt.  
High interest rates combined with the pegged exchange rate attracted even more capital, 
worsening the state of affairs.  The increased indebtedness, jointly with the rigid fiscal, 
monetary, and exchange rate policies,  left the economy vulnerable and with no capacity 
to absorb shocks.  When the  Asian and Russian financial crises occurred in 1997-1998, 
Brazil was severely affected due to its sizeable external financing requirements. In 
January 1999, the central bank abandoned its crawling peg exchange rate regime in favor 
of a flexible rate and adopted an inflation-targeting framework for managing monetary 
policy. 
9.  Simultaneously, the country began to tackle its fiscal imbalance by launching the 
Fiscal Stability Program, which consisted not only in raising taxes to obtain primary 
surpluses, but also in designing a legal framework for fiscal policy management.  The 
government set and met stringent targets for the primary fiscal surplus; the public sector 
primary surplus reached  3.3 percent of GDP in 1999, 3.5 percent in 2000, 3.7 percent in 
2001, 4.1 percent in 2002, and 4.3 percent in 2003.  The government also passed 
measures,  including the state debt refinancing program and the landmark Law of Fiscal 
Responsibility, that brought about a robust sub-national fiscal adjustment. The adjustment 
process included a move towards greater transparency, as existing but previously 
unrecorded liabilities were recognized and public managers were made accountable for 6 
their expenditure decisions. These measures reflected the national consensus on the need 
for fiscal discipline at all governmental levels. 
10.  Making the public budget more flexible and responsive to shocks will constitute 
the main challenge of Brazilian fiscal policy in the future.  The capacity to change   
government savings is a crucial element to guarantee sustainability as external conditions 
evolve.  However, in Brazil, this ability to control savings is extremely limited given the 
expenditure mandates and revenue-sharing and earmarking.
2 
11.  This ability is central for stabilization purposes.  The present-value borrowing 
constraint
3 that the government faces will always be met.  For instance, if public debt 
goes up, the expected primary surplus should also rise to ensure that the larger 
obligations will be repaid.  If that is not feasible, the budgetary restriction equation will 
be adjusted either through an increase of the price level or a reduction of debt service.   
The precise form of the adjustment process to equilibrium depends on the flexibility of 
fiscal policy and on the composition of  public debt.  If government expenditures and 
taxes are predetermined, some other variable such as prices or asset returns, has to adjust 
to obtain the balance.  How much or how fast prices react will depend on the maturity 
structure of public debt and on the degree of indexation of public debt.  This topic is 
discussed in the next section. 
12.  Fiscal policy flexibility is also necessary to exploit its advantage as a  signaling 
tool.  In a world of imperfect information, in which investors do not know the debt 
issuer’s true commitment to meet its obligations, a committed sovereign must 
differentiate itself from other types of debtors to be able to issue new debt.  The primary 
surplus is the most exogenous policy tool that a government has to signal its commitment 
to pay its future obligations.  As debt increases, the primary balance should go up to 
signal investors that the government is willing to adjust in order to maintain its 
intertemporal budget.
4   As the country’s indebtedness increases, so does the cost of debt, 
and hence the larger the incentive for the reliable government to adjust fiscal policy to 
signal its commitment. Evidence shows that the primary balance had a larger impact on 
the credit ratings and on the cost of financing as the debt ratio increased in the case of 
four European countries (Drudi and Prati, 2002) and in Brazil (Herrera, 2002). 
13.    The value of having a flexible fiscal policy in the context of external shocks can 
be seen in the contrasting experience of Argentina and Brazil in 1999-2001.  Despite the 
similarity of the public indebtedness indicators in both countries, Argentina suffered a 
major crisis in 2001 while Brazil avoided it.  Table 1 shows various indicators of the 
magnitude of the public debt burden and the fiscal stance in both countries. The primary 
                                                 
2 The Desvinculacao das Receitas da Uniao, or DRU is a mechanism that allows some flexibility by 
allowing the federal government to retain 20 percent of net revenues before applying the earmarking. 
3 This constraints sets the equality between the discounted expected government revenues and the future 
flow of government spending including servicincng the debt. 
4 Bohn (1998) claims that this property of fiscal policy, namely the positive reaction of the primary surplus 
to changes in debt levels, is a necessary condition for long run solvency, and hence proposes it as a 
statistical test for verifying compliance of intertemporal  budget restrictions. 7 
fiscal balance is the main indicator distinguishing both countries. Is it possible that this 




Summary of Public Debt Indicators in Argentina and Brazil 2000-2001 
 Argentina  Brazil 
  2000 2001 2000  2001 
Public Debt (% of GDP)  50.0  62.0  49.6  53.3 
Interest payments (% of GDP)  4.1  5.4  7.2  7.3 
Interest/ tax revenue (%)  22.7  30.9  30.9  29.8 
Interest/current revenue (%)  16.6  22.9  18.0  16.5 
Overall fiscal balance (% of  GDP) -3.6 -6.8 -3.6  -3.6 
Primary fiscal balance (% of GDP)  0.4  -1.4  3.6  3.8 
Source: Source: World Bank staff calculations based on official data for Brazil, Bacen and for Argentina, Minsterio de Economia. 
 
14.  To answer this question, it is necessary to examine in retrospect the relationship 
between primary balances and debt levels in both countries. While  primary balances 
were similar until 1998, they diverged from 1999 onwards as Figure 1 shows.  When debt 
ratios increased in 1999, the primary balance registered a significant surplus signaling 
Brazil’s commitment to adjustment.  Statistical evidence supports the hypothesis that 
primary balances acted as signaling tools in Brazil (Herrera, 2002) and in other European 
countries that successfully overcame credibility problems (Drudi and Prati, 2000) unlike 
in Argentina’s case. 
Figure 1 
Primary Balances and Debt Ratios in Argentina and Brazil 1995 – 2001 
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Source:  Herrera (2002) 
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B.  POLICY RIGIDITY AND THE 2002 CRISIS 
15.  In sharp contrast with the 1998-1999 adjustment, Brazil’s fiscal policy did not 
react to the shocks in early 2002.  This policy rigidity compounded uncertainty arising 
from other sources and led to asset price changes that complicated the situation even 
more. The government’s commitment to maintain a constant primary surplus seemed to 
falter as the primary  balance declined during the first semester (Figure 2) amidst a heated 
political debate on the stance of future fiscal policy.  
Figure 2 
Primary Fiscal Balance of the Public Sector 2000-2003 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Source:  Bacen, Boletin Estadistico, several issues 
 
16.  The rigidity of fiscal policy may have been at the root of the 2002 crisis. 
Inflexibility was the result of both structural factors and transitory circumstances. The 
structural inflexibility of the budget exists in both expenditures and revenues: on the 
expenditure side, rigidity arises from constitutional mandates and entitlements, while on 
the income side, it emanates from revenue sharing with the states and earmarking. More 
than 70 percent of primary expenditure is composed of social security benefits  and 
wages (Velloso, 2002), while more than 80 percent of federal government revenues are 
earmarked or subject to revenue sharing (Ministerio de Planejamiento, 2003).  This 
legacy severely limited the options of fiscal adjustment to cutting capital expenditures or 
raising revenues, both of which have limits.  International experience shows that 
successful fiscal adjustments, that is, those that are permanent, rely more on current 
expenditure cuts than on revenue hikes or capital spending reduction (Alesina and Peroti, 
1996).  Given that, by 2001, the primary surplus had already reached  3.8 percent of 
GDP, with capital expenditures dropping to historically low levels and public sector 
revenues reaching extraordinarily high echelons, it was difficult to increase public 
savings without compromising the quality of the adjustment. 
17.  Fiscal policy rigidity was also due to the short-term effect of the October   
presidential elections.  The government’s coalition had weakened because of internal 
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congress led to the impeachment of its president, a strong supporter of the government’s 
economic policy.  In this context, crucial reforms with fiscal impact, namely the public 
servants social security and tax reforms, were left pending.  Other reforms, such as the 
extension of the financial transactions tax, or CPMF, stalled. With the political campaign 
heating up in the first quarter, it was practically impossible to get support for any 
adjustment.  Additionally, any change would have been interpreted as transitory given 
that a new government would take office  in the near future. 
18. Uncertainty  regarding  the  future government’s commitment to fiscal adjustment 
(irrespective of who won the election) generated concerns about the future value or 
liquidity of public debt.  Given the concentration of public debt holdings in mutual funds 
(to be discussed in the next section), a significant resource outflow affected them in the 
period April-October. In its peak, the run represented more than 6 percent of the 
intermediaries’ net worth (Figure 3). 
Figure 3 
Net Resource Flow to Mutual Funds 




19.  The sell-off of government securities caused a fall in their price (rising spreads), 
which in turn  pressured  the exchange rate to depreciate (Figure 4).  The rising spreads 
and the exchange rate depreciation were also associated with capital outflows from 
Brazil.  As Figure 5 shows, in September and October, capital outflows reached a peak of 
almost 20 percent of international reserves of the central bank.
5  During these months the 
exchange rate also reached a peak of 4 reais per dollar.  Consequently, the debt level rose 
due to its indexing to the exchange rate.  This fact aggravated concerns on debt 
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sustainability which exerted further downward pressure on the demand for Brazilian 
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Figure 5 
Capital Flows to Brazil 
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20.  The fall of Brazilian government securities’ prices and capital outflows also 
occurred because of a global phenomenon: the rise in uncertainty and risk aversion due to 
the growth slowdown of the industrialized nations, the terrorist attacks in the United 
States, and the corporate corruption scandals of the more mature capital markets around 
the world.  This fact exerted additional downward pressure on  Brazilian government 
paper, and made those prices move in tandem with asset prices worldwide (Figure 6).  
Favero and Giavazzi (2003) show how Brazilian spreads depend both on domestic 
factors, in particular the stance of fiscal policy, and on global conditions. The relationship 
between external factors and Brazilian sovereign spreads is non-linear: when domestic 
fundamentals are sound, this relationship is not as clear, but when fiscal fundamentals are 
weak, the effect of global factors is amplified.  11 
Figure 6 
Co-movement of Brazil C Bond Prices and the Dow Jones Index 
Evidence of Global Factors’ Influence on Brazilian Asset Prices 
 
Source:  World Bank staff calculations 
 
21.  Faced with mounting difficulties in rolling over the domestic debt, the central 
bank redeemed a fraction of debt falling due by printing money.  Consequently, the 
monetary base expansion exceeded nominal GDP growth (Figure 7).  The monetary 
effect of public domestic debt redemptions during the second semester of 2002 reached 
the tenor of 30 percent of base money (Figure 8).  It is crucial to point out, however, that 
the positive monetary expansion due to the treasury’s operation began in the second 
semester of 2001 and could have been interpreted as a leading indicator of  the more 
turbulent episodes that were to unravel in mid 2002. 
Figure 7 
Money Base as a Share of GDP 
(seasonally adjusted data 
Figure 8 
Monetary Impact of Treasury’s  
Operations 1999- 2003 
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22.  Moreover, base money grew in lockstep with the faster depreciation of the 
currency.  This pressured inflation, which accelerated between June and December, 
reaching a peak of  5.8 percent per month in November (Figure 9).  Monetary growth and 
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equivalent of 2.0 percent of GDP
6 (Figure 10).  In these circumstances, the credibility of 
the public on the authorities’ ability to control inflation faltered.  It is interesting to note 
that the seignorage peak occurred in the first quarter of 2003, a few months after the 
public debt ratio had stabilized and the exchange rate had appreciated.  This implies that 
interest rates could not be lowered as quickly as many would have desired. 
 
Figure 9 
Monthly Inflation Rate in Brazil 2000-2003 
(seasonally adjusted General Price Level 
IGP-DI) 
Figure 10 
Seignorage from Money Creation 2000-2003 
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Source: FGV  Source:  World Bank calculations described in text. 
 
23. The  monetary  authorities  reacted variously to the shocks during the 2001-2002 
period. In the initial stage, from March 2001 to July 2001, the central bank raised the 
Selic rate from 15.25 percent to 19 percent.. From then on, it maintained the Selic at 19 
percent, until February 2002, when it reduced it 25 bps, then lowered it again in March 
and July.  In mid-October 2002,  the central bank bumped up the Selic three percentage 
points to 21 percent and then raised it two more times until reaching 25 percent before the 
year’s end (Figure 11). As the Selic rose, the exchange rate partially reversed its 
depreciating trend, and the debt stock (as a percent of GDP) began decreasing. Looking 
(ex-post) at this behavior, it is legitimate to wonder why the central bank did not raise 
interest rates before October.  Interestingly, it also raises the question of the applicability 
of Blanchard’s model to the Brazilian experience,  since that paper presents the case for 
the potential destabilizing role of  monetary policy when interest rates are increased, but 
the crisis occurred in the context of  stable policy interest rates. 
24.  Several factors might explain the central bank’s delayed reaction and some are 
related to considerations described by Blanchard’s model. The first reason is that, before 
September-October, the fiscal conditions were  inadequate.  Public debt to GDP increased 
from 49 percent to 53 percent in 2001, and climbed further to 57 percent by mid-2002 
without any policy response. With the primary balance decreasing during the first 
semester of 2002, it is understandable that sustainability concerns dominated investor 
                                                 
6 The figures reported in the text and in the graph are estimated by multiplying the base money as a share of 
GDP times the growth rate on base money. Eliana Cardoso (1998) estimates the average inflation tax 
revenue in Brazil during the 50 years ending 1995 at 2 percent of GDP.  13 
sentiment.
7  With taxes and expenditures predetermined by the electoral process and the 
structural rigidity of the budget, the adjustment of the government’s real cash flow could 
come through several avenues:  an increase in the price level, a higher seignorage, or a 
default  The nature of the fiscal regime could have switched from one in which the 
primary surplus would de adjusted with certainty to ensure debt sustainability to one 
where there was uncertainty on how the adjustment would take place. A-priori it was 
difficult to envision how the adjustment would take place, and the composition of public 
debt, which we discuss in the following section, determined the final outcome. 
25.    The crucial point to bear in mind is that, under the circumstances of rising debt 
levels with an unresponsive fiscal policy, raising the Selic could have been inflationary.
8  
The higher cost of debt service (with an unresponsive primary surplus) would have led to 
a higher probability of default.  This, in turn, would have accelerated capital outflows, 
increasing pressure on the currency to depreciate and hence, on inflation.  Since printing 
money and higher prices were part of the solution to the imbalance in the government’s 
present-value borrowing constraint, fiscal expectations were inconsistent with a stable 
price level.  In fact, since September 2001 inflation expectations were permanently above 
the central bank’s central target and by mid-2002 market expectations of inflation were 
regularly above the forecasts of the more robust models (Minella, et.al. 2003).   
Additionally, there is evidence of changes in the price formation mechanism in Brazil at 
the end of 2002 that researchers attribute to changes in the exchange rate pass-through 
(Belaisch, 2003).  However, these changes in the observed price formation and inflation 
expectations generating mechanisms could have also been the result of the changes in 
fiscal expectations arising from a different fiscal regime during this brief period.   
26.  Empirical verification of the nature of the prevailing fiscal policy regime in a 
particular  period poses challenges both from the conceptual and practical viewpoints. At 
the conceptual level, verification of the nature of the fiscal regime would require testing 
whether the primary surplus would have been the same if another price sequence would 
have been observed.
9  Unfortunately, history only shows the actual (one) realization of 
the price level and hence it is impossible to verify whether the surplus would have been 
the same with a different price sequence (Woodford, 2001;  Kocherlakota et al., 1999).  
                                                 
7 This is what Blanchard calls the “wrong” fiscal conditions.  Woodford (2001) call this a non-Ricardian 
environment.  A Ricardian environment is one in which expected future primary surpluses adjust to 
compensate variations in the present value of debt, while in non-Ricardian regimes this policy adjustment 
certainty is non-existent. 
8 Woodford (2001)  shows how the price level may be determined by fiscal variables.  The government’s 
inability to balance its  budget constraint via adjustments in the primary surplus, implies that the price level 
is the adjustment mechanism.  Hence, the budget constraint acts as an equilibrium condition wich 
determines a unique price level associated with the particular fiscal policy.  Previous episodes of Brazilian 
inflation in the 1970’s and 1980s  have been explained based on these grounds (Loyo, 1999).  The 
Favero_Givazzi and Blanchard papers in this volume extend this theory to allow the price of debt (or the 
sovereign risk premium) to be the adjusting factor. 
9 In a controlled experiment situation, if another price (of goods or of sovereign debt) sequence could be 
associated with the same fiscal policy, then the hypothesis could be falsified. However, in reality we only 
observe the actual price sequence and, hence, cannot tell whether the fiscal policy would have been the 
same under a different price sequence. 14 
27.  At the more practical level, verification of the character of the fiscal regime   
focuses on testing the responsiveness of the primary balance to changes in different 
variables (Bohn, 1998).  These tests perform regressions of the primary surplus on the 
public debt ratio and other control variables to verify the significance of this particular 
coefficient. A positive (and significant) response of the primary surplus to changes in the 
debt ratio implies that this policy variable was the adjustment factor.  In Brazil, the 
brevity of the period during which this regime change might have occurred limits any 
statistical testing.  There are, however, studies that test this hypothesis using longer 
sample periods, with results extremely sensitive to the period of analysis. For instance, 
two papers in this volume report contradictory evidence: Favero and Giavazzi show that 
the primary surplus is highly persistent and unresponsive to any oscillation in the debt 
level; Wyplosz concludes that the observed surplus was similar to  the one that would 
have resulted if the government had followed a rule that tried to stabilize the debt ratio 
while allowing some counter-cyclical action.  It is very likely that this divergence 
corresponds to the different sample periods: while the first study estimates the 
relationship after July 1999, the second one begins in 1998.  Since there is a regime shift 
in fiscal policy in 1998-1999 described elsewhere (World Bank, 2000) and verified 
econometrically (Herrera, 2002), the Favero-Giavazzi paper does not capture this change.  
28.  The second explanatory factor for the central bank’s resistance to raise the policy 
rate was the vulnerable situation of mutual funds.  Given the run on mutual fund deposits, 
raising the Selic would have been extremely risky because of the potential to aggravate 
losses to these intermediaries. As described in the next section, mutual funds were 
registering losses due to updating their balance sheets with new mark-to –market 
regulation from the central bank   Raising the Selic would have increased the risk of a 
generalized run on the system.  Additionally, in the face of a decreased demand of public 
bonds, to be described in the next section, the central bank was supporting the price of 
these assets.  Under this extraordinary circumstances imposed by the public bond price 
support role, equivalent to an interest rate peg, liquidity was endogenous, and hence it 
would have been contradictory to try to control liquidity (by raising  the Selic).
10  Given 
that monetary policy was unable to respond, it would have been desirable that fiscal 
policy had been more responsive to the shocks. 
29.  By October 2002, the characterization of the economy had changed in several 
respects: (1) the run on mutual funds had been contained; (2) the presidential candidates 
had already agreed on sound fiscal policy principles; (3) the primary surplus reversed its 
decreasing trend and rose to unsurpassed levels.  Clearly, the factors that originated the 
“wrong” expectations were not present any more.  The central bank was then free to raise 
interest rates and quickly moved in this direction, bringing about the expected traditional 
results of the currency appreciating in response to tighter  monetary policy as  described  
                                                 
10 The Brazilian circumstances of a fixed primary surplus, and a central bank acting to support the price of 
public bonds ( peging the interest rate) fit perfectly  Woodford’s characterization of the  typical non-
Ricardian regime (Woodford, 1998, 2001), with the implication of the effect of fiscal expectations on the 
price level. 15 
in Figure 11.  Control of the economy was gradually regained and consolidated after the 
first quarter of 2003. 
Figure 11 




30.  The run on mutual funds investments highlights two critical issues for monetary 
and financial policies:  first, the importance of having balance sheets that adequately 
reflect the value of intermediaries’ assets and, hence. mark-to-market regulation; second, 
the relevance of monitoring the risk positions of intermediaries that invest in long term 
government paper funded with liquid deposits.  Had government securities been 
registered at their market value rather than their face value, part of the herd behavior 
could have been avoided.  Hence the need to move in that direction was desirable. 
However,  the transition from one accounting system to another should be done during 
tranquil times, not during crisis episodes.  Liquidity risk originated in the transformation 
of liquid deposits into long-term government securities was not monitored accurately and 
ended up in the central bank market intervention described below.  Additionally, the 
improper disclosure of information does not allow the end-investor to properly assess risk 
and hence is not conducive to the creation of  a diversified public debt holder base, an 
important element in risk management of the public debt. 
II.  PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT: INSTRUMENTS THAT 
FACILITATE DEBT STABILIZATION 
31.  Public debt management may be geared to compensate structural budget 
rigidities, but may also amplify the negative effects of external shocks if the cost-risk 
trade-offs are not adequately balanced.  Ideally, public debt composition would be such 
that, in response to a negative shock to the budget, debt service would decrease.   
However, the  Brazilian structure of public debt, short- run and   indexed to the exchange 
rate or to interest rates, amplified the negative effects of the supply and international 





















holders in banks and mutual funds. These features are a legacy of volatility, uncertainty, 
and institutional factors that amalgamated public debt management, monetary and 
exchange rate policies during many years.  These are examined in the  fist section while 
the second one describes the policy responses in the context of no degrees of freedom. 
A. FEATURES OF THE BRAZILIAN PUBLIC DEBT 
32.  Brazilian public debt has four features that are critical to understand the market’s 
reaction and the policy responses to the 2001-2002 shocks: first, public debt is  mostly 
domestic, with the ratio of domestic to external debt at 4:1; second, it has short maturity 
and duration; third, it is strongly biased towards indexed debt, both to short term interest 
rates and the exchange rate; and fourth, it is held mostly by financial intermediaries, in 
particular, mutual funds.  These four features interacted inducing significant vulnerability 
of the economy and shaped the policy responses to the shocks. In what follows we 
discuss the interaction of these features and describe the policy responses. 
33.  The first feature, namely that Brazilian debt is mostly domestic, and payable in 
local currency,  facilitated adjustment.  The fact that most of the debt was payable in 
Reais,  which are nothing more than a more liquid type of government liability, made the 
default option less likely.  The central bank  had the option of printing money to amortize 
debt, which it did. In a sense, there was no doubt that the government had the ability to 
deliver the Reais it had promised.  On the other hand, the fact that the debt was payable in 
local currency led to fiscal expectations that were not consistent with a stable price level:  
more local currency led to more depreciated exchange rates and higher inflation.  
34.  The second particular feature of Brazilian debt, its short maturity, implied roll-
over risk was at the forefront of the debt manager’s problem The short duration also 
implied that, if inflation was the chosen equilibrating factor of the government’s real 
budget cash flow  then it would have to be substantial because longer term securities are 
more sensitive to inflation changes.  Since the Russian crisis of 1998-1999 until 2001, 
authorities succeeded in reducing rollover risk.  The average maturity of (auctioned) debt 
rose steeply from about 8 months in 1998 to about 30 months by September 2001. 
Similarly, the proportion of debt falling due in the next 12 months decreased from 53 
percent at end-1999 to 26 percent at end-2001   
35.  This reduction in roll-over risk from 1999 to 2001 was achieved at the expense of 
increasing market risk, and in particular, exchange rate risk.  In times of volatility, private 
agents demand instruments to hedge their market risk (exchange rate and interest rate), 
and the government provided the vehicles by issuing dollar-indexed debt and Selic-
indexed debt. This, in part, explains why the Real crisis of 1999 did not affect the private 
sector and in particular the banking sector.  In 2001, history seemed to repeat itself as the 
issuance of dollar-linked debt increased.  Hence, in the recent crises the private sector 
was well hedged against shocks to interest rates and exchange rates, which might explain 
why  there were no severe output contractions nor banking crises.  However,  this 
happened at the expense of rising public debt.. As will be seen below, the gains in 
rollover risk reduction were reversed during the 2002 crisis. 17 
36.  The short maturity of public debt implies that both the Treasury and the central 
bank operate on the same end of the yield curve. This requires a skillful coordination of  
monetary policy and public debt management.  Debt managers tend to shorten maturity 
during turbulent times, which is a natural thing to do as the term spreads skyrocket. As 
the public debt shortens its maturity, it becomes, in the limit, a substitute for narrow 
money.  In principle, the Central Bank could redeem the whole stock of public debt and 
absorb any excess liquidity via repo interventions.  Hence, in theory, there could be an 
equilibrium situation without credit risk and with debt rolled over on a daily basis 
37.  However, the stability of this equilibrium depends on the government’s credibility 
and agent’s willingness to hold the public securities the following day.  As maturity 
shortens, the possibility of a self-fulfilling debt run, analogous to a self-fulfilling bank 
run, increases. In these models, if investors today believe that tomorrow investors will not 
want to hold public debt, they will anticipate a raise in interest rates on government paper 
which will imply larger future borrowing requirements which may lead to future 
illiquidity (depending on the size of the debt), which in turn leads to a collapse on the 
demand for public debt today.  Several theoretical models show that credit risk increases 
as the maturity of the debt shortens (Alessina, Prati and Tabellini, 1990; Drudi and 
Giordano, 2000). 
38.  The third feature of Brazilian debt, indexation to the exchange rate or to the Selic, 
implied a significant loss of control of the debt ratio level (Figure 12) given that these 
variables are not under control of fiscal authorities.. The gains that were achieved in 
reducing the degree of debt indexation as the economy stabilized from 1999 to early 2001 
were committed throughout 2001, when the Argentinean crisis started to unravel.  To 
fight what authorities diagnosed as a speculative attack against the Real, the central bank 
adopted pre-announced daily sale of international reserves and, to mitigate the currency 
depreciation effect of the external shock,  the government issued dollar-linked debt.   
Between May and October of 2001 the dollar linked public bonds circulating outside the 
central bank increased by US$14 billion, or the equivalent of 40 percent of the average 
international reserves level. 18 
Figure 12 
Public Debt Evolution during the Floating Exchange Rate Regime 
Source: Bacen 
 
39.  These bonds had a fixed coupon and were sold at a discount, which would be 
crucial in the months to come.  Given the high demand of the private sector for 
instruments that allowed hedging the exchange rate risk,  average maturity of these bonds 
was doubled, form 9 months in 2000 to 18 months by end-2001.  From the debt 
manager’s viewpoint, rollover risk was reduced (though at the expense of higher 
exchange rate risk.)  From the monetary authorities perspective, the currency was not 
abandoned to a speculative attack due to  Argentina’s crisis. By the year’s end, with an 
exchange rate at 2.32 after having reached a low of 2.80  Reais per dollar, many 
considered this episode an example of a successful intervention to puncture a speculative 
bubble and simultaneously the roll-over risk was reduced due to the lengthening of the 
maturity of the dollar-linked bonds. 
40.  However, in 2002 the negative external shock originated by Argentina’s collapse 
was compounded by the corporate corruption scandals in Wall Street that increased risk 
aversion of international investors.  These external shocks were compounded by two 
domestic factors: a) the uncertainty of the future stance of fiscal policy that was one of 
the hottest issues in the early stages of the electoral campaign; b) the acceleration of  the 
implementation of  daily mark-to-market portfolios of mutual funds to end- May. Mutual 
funds carried public bonds on an accrual basis up until redemption, and originally had 
until September to adjust to the new methodology. To avoid registering the losses 
between the market value and face value, mutual funds began unloading their holdings of 
government paper. In addition, uncertainty about the future stance of fiscal policy and the 
government’s commitment to maintain the primary fiscal surplus, reduced the demand for 
long term government bonds, which precipitated further falls in their price. As some 
funds started to register losses and their net asset value decreased, massive deposit 















1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Exchange Rate
Public Debt (right scale)19 
41.  The fourth feature of Brazilian debt that shaped the outcome when the shocks hit 
the economy, was the concentration of public debt holdings in mutual funds. The holders 
of public debt are mostly financial intermediaries, and among these, holdings are 
concentrated in a few agents (Table 2 ).
11  This concentration is undesirable because  it 
amplifies rollover risk, as participating agents belong to the same sector and are affected 
by the same shocks. Additionally, financial intermediaries have a bargaining power 
derived from the potential for transmission of shocks to rest of the economy, which may 
lead them to assume greater risks and then demand special rescue operations in times of 
trouble.
12  One fact that explains why financial intermediaries hold public bonds is that 
the central bank allows computing government securities as reserve requirement 
holdings. In December 2001, 39 percent of total reserve requirements were held in the 
form of securities. 
Table 2 
Holders of Domestic Public Debt 
Type of Agent  % of total 
Mutual funds  32.3 
Brazilian Banks  30.4 
Reserve Requirements  18.5 
Corporates 7.0 
Foreign banks in Brazil  4.7 
Others 2.9 
Households 1.0 
Brokerage Houses  1.3 
Source: STN, August 2002, Relatorio do Mercado 
B. POLICY REACTIONS TO THE CRISIS WITH NO DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
42.  To mitigate the risk that the run on mutual funds’ deposits spread to the whole 
system, the central bank intervened buffering the contraction in market demand for public 
debt and facilitating its roll-over.  To do so, the Central Bank increased its own holdings 
of public debt, and allowed a recomposition of private sector debt portfolios towards 
shorter maturity and away from fixed rate instruments.  While the central bank held in its 
portfolio about 15 percent of total public bonds issued in 1999, that ratio increased to 
almost 30 percent by end 2002.  This proportion is significantly higher in fixed rate 
instruments, where the central bank held over 60 percent of the total bonds issued in 
December.  
                                                 
11 Three banks and 7 mutual funds hold well over 50 percent of the government debt (Fratzscher and Del 
Valle, 2002).  Concentration is not peculiar to the Brazilian market.  Other more mature markets, such as 
the U.S. are concentrated, at least in operations with some types of instruments: the top quintile of primary 
dealers concentrates over 80 percent of total transactions in inflation-indexed securities (Sack and Elsasser, 
2002).   
12Two other reasons why the concentration of public debt holdings can be harmful:  a) it may give market 
power to the buyers that may collude to set prices.  b)  bond holding concentration could imply a regressive 
expenditure structure, given that interest payments on domestic debt constitute wealth redistribution from 
taxpayers to domestic bondholders if both group of agents are not the same. 20 
43.    Simultaneously, the central bank used its large holdings of government securities 
to conduct debt exchanges, shortening the maturity of public debt held by the market. 
Between August and October, approximately 52 percent of the outstanding Selic-indexed 
debt was swapped for shorter term Selic-indexed debt.
13  As a consequence, the average 
maturity of selic-indexed debt held by the market fell from 36 months in March 2002 to 
20 months in January 2003 and the percentage of debt coming due in the following 12 
months rose from 6 percent to over 50 percent in the same period.  As a result of the 
crisis, the public debt changed composition, ending up with less fixed rate debt and 
shorter maturities. 
44.  Exchange rate risk exposure during the 2002 crisis remained relatively stable, and 
even decreased.  In May 2002, the central bank began issuing swaps seeking to relieve 
some pressure off the exchange rate without increasing the stock of public debt. The 
Treasury simultaneously reduced the issuance of dollar-linked debt, but unfortunately net 
treasury dollar-linked debt did not decrease quickly enough to compensate the higher cost 
of depreciation.  Hence, as the currency depreciated the  share of dollar-linked debt 
(including central bank swaps)  rose from 29 percent to 41 percent between March and 
September.  However, in dollar terms, total exposure to exchange rate risk reached a peak 
in December 2001 and remained at that level until May when it began falling (Table 3).  
The rise in the proportion of the dollar-linked debt reflects the higher value (cost) in 
Reais of portfolio composition chosen in the past, in particular during 2001 to alleviate 
pressure on the exchange rate.  The reduction in the exposure to exchange rate risk is 
crucial to obtain more control of the public debt level.  A clearer definition of the   
monetary and debt management functions would contribute to have a unified and steady 
debt management strategy that would reduce uncertainty about future funding plans for 
the overall public sector. 
45.  To a great extent, debt managers were forced to intervene in the market to support 
the price of government securities because of the illiquid nature of the secondary markets 
for delivery. In contrast, the repo or the derivatives markets of government securities are 
very liquid.  However, repo markets can only provide transitory liquidity and hence, 
cannot be a permanent liquidity source for government securities holders.  Therefore, 
they cannot reduce liquidity risks for bondholders that wish access to cash.  In periods of 
excess volatility,  as the 2002 experience demonstrates, debt managers will feel 
compelled to absorb part of the risk given the absence of proper functioning adjustment 
mechanisms.  Additionally, without secondary markets for delivery of government 
securities, extending maturity to reduce rollover-risk will be extremely difficult and more 
costly.
14   
                                                 
13 STN website www.stn.gov.br  Leiloes de Permuta 
14 The derivatives and repo markets have drained much of the liquidity from the cash markets (and from 
secondary markets for delivery), because these transactions are not subject to reserve requirements or the 
debit tax (CPMF).  Additionally, repos, futures and swaps until very recently were not considered fixed 
income securities, and as
  such were
  subject to quarterly income or capital gains taxes as opposed to 
monthly in the case of a cash fixed income instruments.  All these considerations discourage securities 
trading in the cash market and hence inhibit the development of a secondary market for government debt.  21 
46.  Over time, debt managers will have to rebalance the relative weights of financial 
cost vs. longer maturities, and accept the higher cost of issuing longer maturities to 
reduce roll-over risk.  In taking steps to lengthen duration and reduce the indexation of 
debt to foreign currency, the authorities will face some difficult choices.  As progress 
continues on fiscal consolidation and debt ratios fall, it should be possible to replace 
indexed debt with fixed-rate, domestic currency debt with equal or longer maturities.  
This should be done in a way that would not significantly erode the average life of 
outstanding debt.  The authorities’ ability to issue such debt will be limited by the degree 
of market acceptance of longer maturity fixed-rate debt and the steepness of the yield 
curve, which in part is caused by a lack of liquidity in longer-term fixed rate issues owing 
to the lack of issuance of these securities over the past few years.  Models such as those 
developed by Missale and Giavazzi (2003) are useful for debt managers to quantify these 
tradeoffs . 
Table 3 
Exposure of Brazilian Public Debt to Exchange Rate Risk  2000- 2003 
 Treasury  Dollar 
linked debt 




(R $ bi.) 
(2) 
Total  exchange 
rate exposure 











in dollar terms 
(US$ bi) 
(6) 
December 00  114  -  114  22  2.0  58 
December 01  179  -  179  29  2.3  77 
March 02  179  -  179  29  2.3  77 
May 2002  179  14  193  30  2.5  77 
September 02  191  77  268  41  3.9  69 
December 02  139  91  230  37  3.5  65 
November 03  82  92  174  24  3.0  59 
(1), (2), (3) , (4) Source; Relatorios da Divida Publica 
(5) Average exchange rate for the month 
(6)=(3)/(5) 
III. FISCAL RULES: POLICY ELIMINATED AS SOURCE OF 
INSTABILITY 
47.  The Brazilian experience of 2001-2003 shows that the coordination between fiscal  
and monetary policies is necessary to stabilize the economy.  When monetary policy is 
not able to react to a given shock, then fiscal policy has to be more responsive. There 
may be circumstances when fiscal events, or expectations of them, are determinants of 
price changes or of interest rates, and these expectations might not be consistent with the 
central bank’s objectives. Functional independence of the central bank, meaning its 
ability to guarantee that its actions will influence inflation expectations and keep them 
within certain bounds to meet an inflation target, can only exist if fiscal expectations are 
not  inconsistent with price stability. Hence, functional independence of the central bank 
is a necessary complement of legislative independence which isolates monetary policy 
form political interference. 
48.  Fiscal policy could contribute to growth and mitigate debt sustainability concerns 
through at least three channels:   First,  by choosing a particular composition of public 
expenditures, the government implicitly may determine a specific growth pattern that 
affects its debt servicing capacity. For instance, Brazil has a composition and level of 22 
public expenditure that deviate substantially from the Latin American benchmark and 
affects long term growth (Rioja and Glomm, 2003).
15  Second, by minimizing the burden 
of taxation, subject to revenue collection requirements, the government can alter growth 
prospects. A recent study (DRI-WEFA, 2002) shows that by reducing tax rates by 20 
percent, the yearly steady state growth rate can be increased by almost 0.5 percent.   
Research and empirical quantification of the welfare impact of different types of taxation 
in Brazil is in its infant stage, but there are promising results (Suescun, 2003).  Third, by 
reducing uncertainty about the sustainability of the economic policy framework, which is 
achieved through the adequate coordination with other economic policy tools.  The 
present report concentrates on this stabilization aspect of fiscal policy. 
49.   The adoption of a commitment mechanism for fiscal policy would contribute to 
rule out the possibility that fiscal policy and expectations derived from the fiscal 
framework play a destabilizing role (Woodford, 2001; Canzoneri, Cumby and 
Diba,2002).  The ability to commit is important in this case because anticipations of 
future government actions influence the current decisions of private individuals.  For 
instance, anticipations of future taxation affect current private investment, or expectations 
of future debt servicing capacity influence current bond holding decisions.  By 
committing, the government can achieve better policy outcomes, as economists have 
learned from the literature on rules versus discretion over the past 25 years
16 (Stokey, 
2002).  There are alternative institutional arrangements that would allow a government to 
commit fiscal policy, such as  fiscal responsibility laws,  fiscal rules, or delegation of 
fiscal decision making to supranational authorities or advisory committees of experts.  
Brazil has successfully advanced with the fiscal responsibility law option, though it is not 
a generalized experience throughout the region (Webb, 2004).  This chapter briefly 
describes the Brazilian fiscal commitment mechanism and suggests possible avenues for 
its further development. 
A. THE BRAZILIAN FISCAL COMMITMENT MECHANISM: THE LAW OF FISCAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
50.  The Brazilian success with this commitment mechanism owes to a combination of 
factors. The crucial ones being the inclusion of all government levels (federal and sub-
national), the incorporation of enforcement mechanisms, and the design of transition 
paths for those states or municipalities that initially did not meet the benchmarks. These 
principles should be applicable to any institutional arrangement that seeks to commit 
credibly future fiscal policy decisions.  The three factors are related and this section 
describes this interaction, especially between the first two. 
                                                 
15 Rioja and Glomm (2003) show how Brazil public expenditure is not only higher than the rest of the Latin 
American countries,  but also biased towards transfer payments. 
16 The “bad” outcomes may arise from several sources.  One is the time inconsistency problem, according 
to which even a benevolent Ramsey-type government has incentive to deviate from a planned policy, and 
that deviation will result in everybody’s benefit.  However, agents anticipate that government behavior, 
making the original government plan incredible.  Another source of “bad” outcomes, or deviations from 
optimal  policy plans, arises from the action of interest groups that derail the government’s original plan.  
As agents anticipate this outcome, policies loose credibility resulting in sub-optimal outcomes. 23 
51.  The history of the federal-sub-national relationship in fiscal matters shows that, 
until 1997, the story was complex and not always positive (Ter Minassian, 1997).  The 
complex structure of fiscal federalism determined the lack of fiscal co-responsibility and 
the absence of hard budget constraints by lower government levels.  There was no control 
of sub national indebtedness, and the federal government bailed out states and 
municipalities on several occasions. In less than ten years, the federal government 
restructured sub national debt three times: In 1989, the federal government assumed part 
of the states’ external debt, which totaled 2 percent of GDP; in 1993, the federal 
government refinanced the state and municipal debt with federal financial agencies, an 
amount equivalent to 7.2 percent of GDP; finally, in 1997, the federal government 
restructured the states’ bonded debt, an operation amounting to 11.5 percent of GDP.  
52.  Unlike the previous two refinancing operations, the 1997 bail-out was conditioned 
upon the state’s compliance with fiscal adjustment and structural reform programs. In 
exchange for the rescue package, the federal government negotiated agreements with 25 
states in 1997 and 1998.17  Sanctioned by Lei (Law) 9496 of September 1997, these 
agreements included: (i) constraints on borrowing, loan guarantees, debt service and 
amortization, primary deficits and personnel expenditures; (ii) a requirement that states 
privatize their public banks; and (iii) a requirement that states launch reform programs 
using the proceeds from the privatization of other assets. (iv) the collateralization of 
resources to ensure debt service and the corresponding authorization to the federal 
government to withhold transfers mandated by the Constitution,  
53.  In 1999, Senate Resolution No. 78 imposed fixed ceilings on new borrowing, debt 
servicing, and the total stock of debt. The most important constraints imposed were: i) 
new credit operations could not surpass 18 percent of net current revenue; ii) interest 
payments and amortizations could not surpass 13 percent of net current revenue; iii) the 
revenue from credit operations could not exceed capital expenditures (the “golden rule”); 
iv) the stock of state debt could not exceed 2 times net current revenue in the period up to 
2008, after which the debt stock must be less than or equal to net current revenue; v) the 
rollover of the debt could not exceed 95 percent of the debt stock; vi) credit operations 
based on anticipated revenues (“Budgetary Revenue Anticipation” or ARO operations) 
could not exceed 8 percent of net current revenue; vii) credit operations were forbidden 
six months before elections; and viii) credit operations through state enterprises were 
forbidden. 
54.  In addition to these controls on the demand for credit, the federal government also 
acted to restrict the supply of credit.  First, any further intergovernmental and intra-
governmental debt refinancing operations were forbidden. Second, limits were imposed 
on credit operations between public banks and sub national governments. Resolutions 
2827 and 2920 of the National Monetary Council (passed in March and November of 
2001, respectively) limit bank exposure to public sector borrowers to 45 percent of 
equity—a limitation that is particularly binding for the Caixa Econômica Federal which 
constitutes the most important source of credit supply for states and municipalities.   
                                                 
17 Only two states ( Tocantins and Amapá)  did not have any bonded debt, and hence did not participate in 
the refinancing agreements. 24 
55.  These controls were strengthened by the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL), 
approved in May 2000, and by the accompanying Lei de Crimes Fiscais (Law of Fiscal 
Crimes). The FRL consolidated many restrictions and regulations into  a single unifying 
framework.  The three main elements of the FRL are: (i) the explicit prohibition of debt 
refinancing operations between different levels of government, eliminating the moral 
hazard problem that led to the frequent federal government bailouts of the lower-level 
governments; (ii) the clear setting of limits on personnel costs, credit operations, loan 
guarantees and total debt, though the specific values were left to be determined by the 
Senate in separate resolutions; and (iii) the obligation imposed on governments to plan 
their finances based on annual budget targets.
18 
56.  The results were immediate, and what is more important, permanent (Figure 13). 
The aggregate annual primary surplus of states and municipalities improved by 1.1 
percent of GDP over e period 1999 to 2003. State and municipal debt stabilized despite 
the adverse macroeconomic environment characterized by low growth and exchange rate 
devaluation, factors that ordinarily have a negative impact on public debt ratios. 
Figure 13 
Primary Fiscal Balance of States and Municipalities in Brazil 1996-2003 
(in percent of GDP) 
Source:  Bacen 
 
                                                 
18 Senate Resolutions 40 and 43 of December 2001which are complementary to the LRF stated that the 
ratio of personnel expenditure to net current revenue must be below 50 percent for the federal government, 
and below 60 percent for states and municipalities (with specific ceilings set individually for the Executive, 
Legislative and Judiciary branches). These Senate resolutions also imposed a ceiling for the ratio of debt to 
net current revenue of 2 for states and 1.2 for municipalities; a timeframe of 15 years was set for 
convergence to these limits. A comparison between the key constraints of Senate Resolution 78 of 1999 
and the subsequent Resolutions 40 and 43 of 2001, for the states and municipalities shows that the 
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57.  The LRF also enforced fiscal discipline by requiring that new and permanent 
expenditures could not be approved by Congress without corresponding increases in 
permanent revenue or cuts in other permanent spending items.  During electoral years, 
governments are not allowed to make new spending commitments unless these can be 
executed before the end of the incumbent’s term in office. In addition,  credit operations 
are banned in the 8 months prior to each election. 
B.  POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FISCAL COMMITMENT MECHANISM 
58.  There are several aspects of the FRL that can be improved.  First, the triennial 
targets are not binding, so the emphasis of macro-fiscal planning is mostly limited to one-
year horizons. Second, the FRL does not distinguish clearly the objectives from the 
instruments  The current objectives, namely of “responsible fiscal management” and 
“correction of deviations from equilibrium in the public accounts”, could be made more 
precise by stating the gradual reduction of debt level as the objective and the primary 
fiscal balance as the instrument.  Third, the FRL does not explicitly state how the target 
levels for  the primary balances would be set.  Fourth, the “golden rule,”
19 enshrined in 
the Brazilian Constitution since 1988, and defined more precisely in the FRL, has played 
a limited role in controlling real indebtedness and in avoiding fiscal expectations of debt 
crisis.   
59.  Though there are certain problems with the golden rule as a policy guide, it could 
be worthwhile considering some simple modifications that would render it a more useful 
tool. The main conceptual problem with the golden rule is that it does not guarantee the 
maintenance of a constant debt ratio, and much less fiscal solvency.  This is because it is 
not derived from a comprehensive public sector’s balance sheet leaving aside important 
risk positions such as contingent liabilities (Buiter, 2001).  Another problem with the 
golden rule is that it limits borrowing to capital expenditures with the supposed objective 
of  maintaining constant the government’s net worth, but by not contemplating the 
efficiency of investment it is no guarantee of intertemporal solvency.
20  The golden rule 
may inhibit the realization of highly productive investments, or may allow the realization 
of “white elephant” projects. This sets an important agenda for future work on evaluation 
of public expenditure and its returns as a necessary complement for the analysis of 
sustainability of public finances. 
60.  Despite its problems, the golden rule can be a useful complement to other fiscal 
policy guidelines with some minor modifications  For instance, the indebtedness figures 
should include changes in contingent liabilities and changes in risk positions of the 
central bank, like the Swaps, that are not included in regular credit operations.   Both the 
contingent liabilities and the swaps are transparently reported in the LDO and in the 
                                                 
19 The rule stating that governments cannot borrow more than the equivalent of their capital expenditure, or 
alternatively, prohibiting governments to borrow to finance current expenditures. The  objective is to 
distribute the cost of the investment project (and the taxing to finance it) in a manner that reflects the 
distribution of the benefits through time. 
20 Another problem with this rule is the potential for creative accounting, and the classification of 
expenditures into current or capital  26 
central bank reports, respectively, but are not incorporated in these estimations.   
Regarding the golden rule, as it is applied in Brazil, capital depreciation expenditures are 
not deducted from the gross investment figures, implying that indebtedness might end up 
being higher than the level consistent with an efficient distribution across generations of 
the cost of current public investment projects. Hence, capital expenditures figures should 
refer to the net of depreciation charges in order to maintain the public sector’s net worth 
constant.
21  Considering that the net public capital stock to GDP is approximately 40 
percent of GDP and the average depreciation rate is 2.5 percent of GDP,
22 the 
indebtedness limit should be of the order of .8 percent of GDP per year lower than the 
limit actually used.  These calculations and discussions should be made public and 
reported transparently jointly with the rest of the debt operations that are already 
disclosed. 
61.  To improve the fiscal decision-making process, Wyplosz (2003) proposes 
delegating the task of setting the primary surplus to a committee of experts that would 
have fixed-term appointments.  The objective of this delegation would be to isolate this 
decision from the influence of particular interest groups, and draws from the success of 
monetary policy in defeating inflation throughout the world.  Taxation levels and public 
expenditure composition should be decided through the normal democratic processes.  
There is no example in the world of a delegation of this kind, though the Maastricht 
Treaty can be considered a delegation to a supranational authority to impose limits on the 
size of the overall fiscal balance and the public debt. 
62.  The design of a fiscal rule that explicitly and effectively binds the primary surplus 
to some medium term objective would be an alternative institutional commitment 
arrangement.  Brazil, has advanced in this respect, as the 2004 Budget Directives Law 
(Ley de Directrices Orcamentarias, LDO) already postulates a target debt level of 51% of 
GDP for 2006. As mentioned before, progress can be made by making this target binding, 
and by explicitly stating how the primary surplus would evolve to meet the medium term 
objective.   Nevertheless, the current approach is right on the mark, as it pays attention to 
first-order considerations, such as the importance of reducing the debt level, though it 
might neglect other issues.  It would be desirable to advance in this same direction with 
any additional work on this topic. 
63.  There are many considerations and features that fiscal commitment mechanisms 
should have (Kopits and Symansky, 1998; Buiter, 2003). We will focus in a few. In 
particular, rules should be well defined in terms of clarifying differences between the 
objectives and the policy instruments; rules should also be well defined regarding the 
institutional coverage, and exit clauses.  As mentioned before, the FRL is exceptional in 
terms of the coverage but could improve on the other definitional aspects.  The second 
feature that the rule must have is transparency. There should be no room for creative 
accounting, and any data changes or revisions, as well as changes in coverage of the 
statistics, must be carefully explained and statistically  In this respect, Brazil has 
                                                 
21  For detailed discussions on the measurement issues of public investment, and its relation with public 
borrowing, see Robinson (1998), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Buiter (2001). 
22 These are IPEAs estimates. 27 
advanced significantly with the Fiscal Risk Annex that is yearly presented in Congress. 
However, further progress may be possible by exploring the linking of the annex and the 
risk analysis with yearly budgets presented to Congress. 
64.  Two other benchmark characteristics for fiscal rules (Kopits and Symansky, 1998; 
Buiter, 2003), namely simplicity and flexibility, may imply trade-offs. Simplicity entails 
that rules should be highly visible and easily verifiable; flexibility involves 
accommodation of deviations from the targets due to exogenous factors, without breaking 
the rule.  A best-practice rule balances the tension between these two requirements.   
Some analysts prefer simplicity to avoid any negative impact on credibility.  For instance, 
Woodford (2001) proposes two very simple fiscal rules:  one  sets the primary balance as 
a function of the public debt level (or deviations of it from a target level), while the other 
postulates a target for the overall public balance (including interest payments) not to 
exceed certain level.  He shows that these types of rules, combined with inflation 
targeting regimes create the right environment for stable and low inflation. The problem 
with simple rules is that there is no room for the use of judgment or extra-model 
information.  If agents learn through time or there is new information, revisions of the 
rule will conflict with the commitment, unless the recommitment option is embedded.
23 
65.  The most common call for flexibility comes from the allowance of automatic 
stabilizers to operate during the business cycle. The allowance of automatic stabilizers 
adds complexity to the rule, because of the computation of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal 
figures.  If it is considered that this additional complexity outweighs the costs in terms of  
lost transparency and simplicity, then the task should be delegated to an independent and  
highly technical committee. Ideally, the central bank would play the leading role to 
ensure the coordination with monetary policy. Flexibility can also be achieved by setting 
medium term targets that go beyond the business cycle.  
66.  To summarize, the more practical approach to ensure a credible commitment for 
fiscal policy would be one that sets the primary balance as the instrument to achieve a 
determined target debt level and simultaneously allows for deviations of output from its 
potential level.  A variant of this type of rule has been proposed for Brazil (Wyplosz, 
2003) and posses several hurdles for implementation.  The first challenge is to determine 
the target public debt level. The desired or prudent debt to GDP level is something that 
depends on structural characteristics of the economy, on the country’s own history, and 
on the international environment.  This implies that it is very difficult to stipulate a figure 
both conceptually and empirically.  At a more intuitive level, it can be argued that a lower 
debt level is preferable given that future debt service implies future taxation and there 
seems to be consensus on the upper limit that tax burden has reached in Brazil.  Brazil 
has advanced in setting 51 percent of GDP as the target level for 2006.   
67.  The proposed fiscal framework would be such that debt targets would be set for 
three or four year horizons.  When the debt ratio reaches the target level or at the end of 
the planning horizon, authorities would reconsider a new and lower target for the new 
medium term horizon.  This sequential targeting is a form allowing some flexibility of 
                                                 
23 The problems with simple rules are pointed by Svensson (2003) in the context of monetary policy rules. 28 
recommitting or incorporating new information, which is essential for simple rules to 
work.  The second practical problem is the relative weight to assign to each of the two 
arguments of the rule, namely the deviations of the debt ratio from the target level and the 
deviations of output from its potential level.
24  Society will have to decide on the relative 
weights assigned to each and those parameters can change through time.  As the debt 
targeting mechanism gains credibility and the public debt level effectively moves to 
lower levels, more weight can be assigned to the automatic stabilizers argument, but in 
the initial stages the debt-stabilization argument is of first order of importance. 
68.  While this report argues for a more explicit and binding commitment for fiscal 
policy at the macro level, it is important to recognize that the strategy will only be 
possible and credible if the government has more flexibility at the micro level in the 
resource allocation. To the extent that the government has little control over revenues, 
due to ear-marking and revenue-sharing, and over expenditures due to constitutional 
mandates and entitlements, the burden of the adjustment falls on capital expenditures and 
revenue-increasing, which impose limits on the sustainability of adjustment. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND MAIN LESSONS 
69.    During 2001-2002, a series of  domestic and external shocks derailed the 
Brazilian economy despite its significant progress in building a policymaking framework 
in the previous years. This happened, to a large extent, due to policy rigidity that resulted 
both from structural factors and short-term political circumstances.  This report examined 
the causes and described the consequences of this policy rigidity with the objective of 
suggesting avenues for further development of a policymaking framework that facilitates 
shock absorption. 
70.  The supply and international capital markets shocks that affected Brazil caused 
the currency to depreciate, which, in turn, affected adversely the debt indicators. Without 
any fiscal policy adjustment, markets were concerned with the government’s ability to 
meet its future obligations.  This uncertainty was compounded by political considerations 
revolving around the stance of future fiscal policy and the willingness of the new 
administration (regardless of who won the election) to meet its payments.  In these 
circumstances, the government’s budget restriction had to be balanced either through 
inflation or a fall in the prices of government securities.  Both options were inconsistent 
with stable prices and were obstacles for the central bank’s anti-inflationary task.. 
71.  The increased uncertainty generated a fall in the demand for government bonds, 
which forced the central bank to intervene in the market by: (1) printing money to redeem 
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where b* and 
y* are the target debt levels and potential output respectively.  The two coefficients should be positive and 
reflect society’s preferences.  The constant term, s, is the value of the primary balance in steady state and 
when the debt target has been achieved, and should be equivalent to (r*-g*)b*  in a world without 
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amortizations coming due; (2) providing support for government securities’ prices by 
holding larger shares of government bonds in its own portfolio; and (3) facilitating the 
change in private agents’ portfolios from long-term fixed-rate instruments to shorter 
maturity and indexed paper.  Additionally, the fall in government securities’ prices 
caused concern on the soundness of mutual funds, that were the main holders of   
government debt, causing investors to withdraw their resources.  In these circumstances, 
monetary policy had no degrees of freedom to operate.  
72.  When the fiscal conditions changed, meaning that the primary surplus increased 
and commitment to future fiscal prudence was certain, the central bank was free to raise 
interest rates and the economy stabilized.  The main challenge for policymakers is to 
design a framework that ensures permanent fulfillment of these conditions, which would 
provide functional independence to the central bank.  This independence implies that the 
central bank can influence inflation expectations and maintain them within specific limits 
to meet the inflation target.  To achieve this, the policymaking framework must ensure 
that expectations of fiscal events, which are exogenous to the central bank, are not 
incompatible with price stability.  Hence, a mechanism that contains fiscal expectations 
within certain bounds is a necessary element of an economic policy framework.   
73.  Fiscal rules are useful mechanisms for this purpose and Brazil has successfully 
experimented with one of them, namely, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL).  However, 
it may be improved in a number of ways.  For instance, the golden rule could be modified 
to deduct depreciation from capital expenditures so that net debt cannot exceed net 
investment.  In this fashion, maintaining a constant public sector net worth, which is the 
rule’s spirit, will be more likely.  A second modification of the golden rule would include 
variations in contingent liabilities within the credit operations and publish reports on the 
compliance of the golden rule.  A third modification to the actual operation of the FRL 
would make binding the triennial primary balance and debt targets expressed in the Ley 
de Directrizes Orcamentarias (LDO).  Any deviations from the target should be publicly 
explained and the corrective action be specified to ensure that, in the medium-term 
targets are met. 
74.  The commitment mechanism may be enhanced by adopting an explicit fiscal rule 
that targets a medium-term debt level and defines the primary balance as the instrument 
to achieve that objective, while allowing the operation of automatic stabilizers along the 
business cycle.  The relative weights assigned to the debt stabilization or the cyclical 
components of the rule could change over time according to society’s preferences.   
Practical implementation of this option would require attention to two factors: one, that 
during the initial stage, while credibility in the debt-targeting mechanism is established, 
higher priority be assigned to the debt stabilization argument; two, that any change   
allowing operation of automatic stabilizers be undertaken during the recovery phase of 
the business cycle to avoid lower primary balances, which would hamper credibility, 
during the transition period. 
75.  The Brazilian experience of 2001-2002 highlights four topics related to public 
debt management that policymakers could consider in their design of the robust 
framework.  First, the degree and type of indexation will influence the path to equilibrium 
after a shock.  Indexed debt, especially to the exchange rate, implies a lack of control of 30 
the target variable.  Debt indexed to the price level or to short run interest rates will limit 
the scope of adjusting any imbalances in the government’s intertemporal budget equation 
through seignorage.  In these circumstances, these are resolved through changes in the 
prices of government securities.  The present value of the debt service is the adjusting 
factor to achieve balance when the primary surplus is predetermined and debt 
composition imposes limits on the ability of seignorage to close the gap.  
76.  Second, the maturity of public debt will also determine the type of adjustment. 
Short duration debt will imply a higher expected inflation or larger currency depreciation 
when fiscal conditions are not appropriate: given that longer duration instruments are 
more sensitive to inflation changes, shorter duration debt requires larger price 
adjustments to obtain the same reduction in value in the event that agents expect the 
intertemporal fiscal balance to be adjusted through inflation.   
77.  The third topic related to public debt management that should be contemplated in 
the robust framework is the need for its coordination with monetary and financial 
policies.  This is especially relevant when debt is of short maturity because both the 
Treasury and the central bank will be operating on the same end of the yield curve. As a 
result of this coordination, the central bank and the capital market regulators have to be 
aware of  three issues regarding the holders of public debt: (i) the importance of having 
balance sheets that adequately reflect the value of intermediaries’ assets, and hence a 
mark-to-market regulation.  In case this regulation does not exist, the timing of the   
transition between accounting systems should be limited to low volatility episodes; (ii) 
financial regulators should have timely and realistic information about the risks assumed 
by agents trading public securities. Prior to the crisis, mutual funds bought long-term 
government paper funded with highly liquid liabilities, assuming liquidity risk.  This was 
possible, in part, because of improper disclosure of information to depositors that were 
guaranteed a risk-free return.  Hence the end-holder of public debt did not have the 
proper elements to assess the true risk of the instrument; (iii) the natural tendency of 
financial intermediaries to concentrate public bond holdings should not be accentuated by 
regulations such as allowing public bonds to compute as reserve requirement holdings. 
78.  The fourth topic related to public debt management refers to the various  trade-
offs implicit in the task, which may affect future debt levels, prices of government 
securities, or fiscal policy.  All of these exacerbate uncertainty.  The Brazilian experience 
reveals a tendency of the public sector to provide exchange rate and interest rate hedges 
to the private sector at the expense of higher debt levels as risks materializes.  In 2001, 
the roll-over risk reduction was achieved at the expense of higher exchange rate risk 
which materialized into higher debt in the following year as the currency depreciated. 
During 2002, rolling over the public debt was possible because the central bank 
intervened heavily in the market to support bond prices and facilitated changes in private 
individual portfolio composition from fixed rate instruments to indexed instruments of 
shorter maturities.  This intervention was necessary, to a great extent, because of the 
absence of well-functioning secondary markets for government securities.  This 
development, as well the gradual reduction of the provision of hedges to the private 
sector, will facilitate the transfer of risk from the government’s balance sheet. This is a 31 
necessary element to reduce uncertainty about the future stance of fiscal policy, and 
hence an important complement to the fiscal rule.  
79.  While this report argues for a more explicit and binding commitment for fiscal 
policy at the macro level, it is important to recognize that the strategy will only be 
possible and credible if the government has more flexibility at the micro level in the 
resource allocation stage. Fiscal rules have to be underpinned by structural reforms that 
allow the government to control closer its revenues and expenditures.  To the extent that 
the government has little control over revenues due to ear-marking and revenue-sharing, 
and over expenditures due to constitutional mandates and entitlements, the burden of the 
adjustment falls on capital expenditures and revenue-increasing, which impose limits on 
its sustainability.  
80.  The issues discussed in this report highlight the need for a parallel work agenda in 
“micro” issues related to the analysis of sustainable public finances.  First, on the effect 
of fiscal policy and long run growth, there is a need for better understanding of the 
impact of different types of government expenditures and different types of taxation on 
growth and welfare. Second, a more in-depth sustainability analysis should be grounded 
on the comparison between the social rate of return of public expenditures and the social 
opportunity cost, including the possible costs associated with future distorting taxation. 
Hence the design and implementation of this evaluation method is of first-order 
importance.  Finally, application of the golden rule requires estimates of the rate of 
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